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This paper explains a philosophically pragmatic approach to the understanding
of historical time, and some implications of that for the transmission of such
understanding. The philosophical route from Hume’s empiricism to American
pragmatism and recent developments in the application of that approach to
historiography are summarised. Such pragmatism is a historicising philosophy.
Quine’s “web of belief” is developed as (1 ) diachronic and not synchronic; (2)
(following Collingwood) idealist and not realist in metaphysics, so history is
that which we conceptually count or organise as such; (3) involving narrative
structures of time, rather than atomistic beliefs in mathematical point-presents.
The ongoing reality of history is then expressed by a rolling web of narrative
temporal structures. History itself and the practice of the discipline are both
understood in these terms. Analysing our understanding of the “present” with
reference to the infant mind, some roles of tenses and voices in the organisation
of time are illustrated using brief literary examples, and choices are stressed as
foundational, constrained only by practice. The paper concludes with the
application of Collingwood’s notion of “absolute presuppositions” to our
understanding of the distinctions between present, past and historical past, and
to the notions of historical distance and hindsight.
Keywords: Quine, Collingwood, idealism, rolling web, narrative temporal







is to think historically. Very briefly, his answer was that to think
historically is to think contextually. He has offered students of history a
lifetime of theoretical and practical understanding of that: for him the
plot structure of historical narrative is central (White, 1 973; White,
1 980; White, 1 987; White, 1 999; Paul, 2011a). Historians –
particularly trainee historians – naturally read “thinking historically” as
meaning “thinking as a historian”, and the seminar proceeded on that
basis. However, history – for better or worse – was recognised by all
concerned as an academic discipline, and White stressed (without
approving) the ways in which the discipline validates intending
historians and admits them to membership, much as the legal profession
requires a certain level of qualification if one is to practise as a lawyer.
Given White’s theory of history, “context” is here best understood as
“narrative context”.Narr atives, whatever else they do, refer to stretches
of time. We should share with White the observation that narrative is
characteristic of much historical writing, whether or not we agree with
his view that to think as a historian is, most importantly, to think
“contextually”. Some might hold instead, for example, that there is a
distinct ability to reason about facts, and that this was most important;
or that being a historian centres on certain specialist skills
(palaeography and diplomatic, say) which only historians are likely to
have; or that the most important paradigms of historical writing are
analytical non-narrative works such as Johann Huizinga’s The Waning of
the Middle Ages or Jacob Burkhardt’s The Civilisation of the
Renaissance in Italy. All narrative theorists, including White,
acknowledge the importance of these, but it is arguable that those works
of history which seem to be non-narrative nevertheless presuppose a
narrative background (Gorman, 2007b, pp. 1 91 -192). Nevertheless,
without committing ourselves to White’s position on the centrality of
narrative, we should read “context” here as referring to temporal
context, whatever other contexts are also appropriate for the material
I
Thinking as a historian and thinking historically
n a seminar at Birkbeck, University of London, on 22nd February
2012, with an audience consisting almost entirely of established
historians and students of history, Hayden White explained what it
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(geographical or economic, for example). Few historians will dispute
that a necessary, even if not the most important, skill of historians
consists in dealing with temporal context: primarily, with the past rather
than the present.
Nevertheless, that central skill of dealing with the past cannot be
limited to historians. “Thinking historically”, as “thinking contextually”,
cannot merely mean “thinking as a historian”, as if one had to be
qualified for admission to the discipline before one could achieve it.
There is, perhaps, some very small merit in holding that only a qualified
lawyer can think in a proper legal way (although, if the law is to apply
to non-lawyers, this point has limited application). By contrast, there is
no merit at all in holding that only a qualified historian can think in a
historical way, given that this is to be mainly understood as thinking
“contextually”. We all of us, historians or otherwise, live in time, in
history. We share with each other the everyday and its historical context,
and our history is continuous with our present. Our shared memories,
cultural heritages and historical beliefs take many temporally stretched
forms, not all of which are appropriate for the disciplinary treatment
which historians are able to provide. “Not every culture has developed
historical consciousness in the same way as the West”, remarked
Hayden White (White, 2007, p. 235).
We may wish to distinguish the understanding of historical time
within the discipline of history from our everyday understanding of
historical time. We may even imagine two cultures of historical
consciousness, that of historians and that of non-historians, possibly
even perceived as rivals in understanding the past. But this move is too
quick. Plausibly, historians’ understanding of historical time
presupposes our everyday understanding of historical time. Indeed,
history is widely conceived by historians as essentially “common
sense.” (Kitson Clark, 1 968, p. 9) “Historical reasoning is continuous
with our everyday reasoning about matters of fact,” remarked Leon
Pompa (Pompa, 1981 , p. 1 82). History is in many ways continuous with
the everyday. Yet this, also, is too quick a move. It is not as if the nature
of our everyday understanding of time is transparent to us. Before
recognising that everyday understanding of time as foundational for
historical understanding, we need to make better sense of it.
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When we try to make sense of our everyday understanding of time,
including historical time, it is appropriate to turn to our best
philosophies of time. Our best philosophies do not stand still, and a
particularly influential philosophy at present is that of American
pragmatism, whose major thinkers include C.S. Peirce, Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. , William James, John Dewey, with later developments by
W.V.O. Quine, Wilfrid Sellars and Richard Rorty. We will draw on a
version of that philosophy here (Gorman, 2007b). Pragmatism is best
seen as a historicising philosophy: it presupposes historical time, and
invites us to see matters with hindsight, so privileging historical
perspective. But this does not mean that we should put the discipline
of history back in a privileged position. Rather, we should observe that
historical perspective is not merely historians’ perspective but also,
given pragmatism, a proper perspective of everyone, including
philosophers. Pragmatism breaks down the artificial barriers between
historical understanding on the part of historians and historical
understanding on the part of the rest of us. We should not think of rival
cultures here. If historians are to be understood as having some unique
grasp of historical context, it is to be found within a pragmatic
understanding shared with non-historians, given the continuity of
historical understanding.
The road to pragmatism
We need to make sense of our everyday experience of ongoing time.
Attending to “experience” may suggest that our approach should be
empiricist, and some may think that we should therefore follow the
philosophy of that arch-empiricist David Hume (Hume, 1739). Hume
saw the human mind as receiving “impressions” from the world
outside, and saw mental operations, including the construction of all our
knowledge, in terms of the association of the various ideas which
merely copied those impressions. He thought of impressions and ideas
as ultimately simple things which were associated, both in our
experienced world and in our knowledge of that world, into complexes.
He invited us to seek the laws and principles which governed these
associations. This philosophical approach was itself supposed by him to
132 Jonathan Gorman - Conveying our sense ofhistorical time
derive from experience, but it does not do so: we do not experience the
world in simple bits (what is here mere assertion is addressed later in
this essay). Hume’s view that experienced reality comes in simples
which amalgamate into complexes is a metaphysical dogma rather than
itself the outcome of experience. Moreover, Hume’s philosophy led to
overly sceptical conclusions: it left us doubting what we thought we
knew perfectly well.
Immanuel Kant, famously awoken by Hume’s arguments (Kant, 1 783,
p. 9), recognised the necessary input of human conceptualisation and
categorisation into the constitution of experienced reality. With Kant, we
typically think of the achievement of knowledge not as the passive
reception of external input, as Hume thought, but as the active focussing
of attention. We must understand that human conceptualising plays a
constitutive and not merely a copying role in our experience. Such
focussing operates within the limits imposed by the conceptualising
categories of the mind. These structure experience. For Kant the world
as we experience it is a complex requiring both what is given in
unstructured perception and also the application ofmental categories.
With regard to our experience of time, Kant thought that Isaac Newton
was right: time and space provide an absolute and objective background
which frames all possible experience. Our individual subjective
understanding of time, what Kant called the a priori form of inner sense
(Kant, 1 787, p. 77), is also the objective time of the universe itself. Here
our grasp of time awkwardly attempts to embrace both sides, the mental
input and the external given. Kant was forced by his distinction between
mental input and the external given into postulating a real but
unknowable world of noumena, of “things-in-themselves”.
Kant thought that Newton’s triumph illustrated the achievement by
universal reason of substantial results about the structure of the
experienced world, results which were eternal and absolute, and
necessarily what they are. Kant applied this view to the course of history
(Kant, 1 784). That things change over time Kant saw in terms of the
predictable and inevitable advance of reason. Given that reason, for him,
was also the foundation of morality, this amounted to claiming the
inevitable advance of morality towards a final perfect state. History is,
necessarily, progress.
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These conclusions of Kant’s philosophy are no longer regarded as
plausible. The horrors of revolutions and wars in the twentieth century
have made the operation of reason in history an unacceptable moral
idea.The re has been and continues to be a historical advance of
science itself (Kuhn, 1970), and even Einstein’s physics is not treated
as absolute truth in the way that Newton’s once was. To treat Newton’s
– or anybody’s – ideas about space and time as absolute truth is now
seen as glaringly arbitrary, while the postulation of an unknowable
world of noumena has long been seen by philosophers as unnecessary
and unintelligible. Such difficulties with Kant’s rationalism have
contributed to giving empiricism, as very broadly understood, the
central place which it has in much western philosophy today. American
pragmatism is, in this very broad sense, empiricist. By contrast with
Kant’s belief in rigid rational absolutes at the foundation of knowledge
and understanding, this pragmatic empiricism holds, as do no doubt
most historians, that the world is not necessarily what it is, but is rather
a matter of contingent occurrences. There is no a priori pattern to
history.
Yet a crucial Kantian point remains. Hume is still wrong. Our
concepts and categories do not merely copy experience, but play a
constitutive role in its construction. Against Hume, concepts and
categories frame experience and are not derived from it; but against
Kant, it is not a matter of fixed eternal rational categories. Current
pragmatic empiricism recognises that it is not merely that the
experienced world is a matter of contingency, but also that what we
count or organise as the experienced world, in thought and language,
also varies with the contingency of circumstance. As Isaiah Berlin
observed (Berlin, 1 980, p. 8), “the facts . . . are not at all identical for all
men at all times”. Counting or organising reality through the
classifications of our language happens not in terms of fixed
categories, but is something human beings can consciously do by
choice (Gorman, 2007b, p. 1 38 and passim).
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The pragmatic frame of history
The American pragmatist W.V.O. Quine uses a metaphor (Gorman,
2011a; Hesse, 1 966), to explain our knowledge and beliefs. These, he
holds, form a “web” which expresses reality as a whole. Truth is not
picked out by the web in an atomistic way, with each belief or claim to
knowledge matching or copying its own little bit of reality. Rather, the
various beliefs are mutually supporting, with those with the fullest
support counting as knowledge. As a result, for Quine, “no statement is
immune to revision”; “Any statement can be held true come what may,
ifwe make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system” (Quine,
1 961 , p. 43). Yet we cannot believe what we like. We may desire to
change our beliefs for various practical reasons, but if we do so we risk
inconsistencies with other beliefs in the web. To avoid these, we may
find we have to revise some of those other beliefs. Counting or sorting
the world differently from the way we currently do characteristically
requires – in our own judgement – adjustment within our system of
beliefs. However, in practice we do not seek to make revolutionary
adjustments to our current web of beliefs, for it has in most
commonsensical ways a satisfactory level of consistency and
practicality. Many of our beliefs are hence in practice regarded as
“established”, and we commonly think the burden of proof lies on those
who wish to revise them. Ongoing slow revision is the central mode of
change in the web (Gorman, 2007a).
For this pragmatic model to be appropriate for framing our
understanding of history it needs to be interpreted in a certain way
(Gorman, 2011a). Some see the web as if it were an ideal equilibrium of
resolved inconsistencies between beliefs. Seen like this, it is a
synchronic abstraction, a durationless slice of time. By contrast the web
should be seen in practical terms as expressing the actual world of
beliefs: real people believing things, noting the beliefs of others and
where they disagree, and seeking resolution, improvement or even
agreement to differ. Such things take time: the web should be
understood diachronically and not synchronically. The web organises
time for us in its ongoing existence. The ongoing reality of history is
expressed by this web, since history is that which we conceptually count
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or organise as such. History itself is inherently diachronic, and so are
both our everyday understanding of it and the practice of the associated
discipline (Gorman, 2007b; Gorman, 2011b).
Earlier we noted that truth is not picked out by the web in an atomistic
way, with each belief or claim to knowledge copying its own little bit of
reality. Rather, the web involves the mutual support of beliefs. It is
important to understand that this philosophy does not seek merely to
replace an atomistic copying of reality with a holistic copying of reality.
The web expresses reality, and is in no way an attempt to “correspond”
to it or to copy it. This philosophy needs to be interpreted as an idealist
metaphysical position, and that is particularly necessary if we are to
make sense of history (Gorman, 1982, 69-80). Idealism denies the
“given” in unstructured perception as a reality wholly independent of us
(Sellars, 1 956). It denies Kant’s unknowable noumena. It denies what is
sometimes called “realism”, that metaphysical faith in a reality wholly
beyond us. “The whole distinction between a subjective and an
objective factor in experience loses most of its significance with the
abolition…of the vicious Kantian distinction between the ‘given’ in
perception and the ‘work of the mind’”, as the idealist A.E. Taylor stated
(Taylor, 1 903, p. 242). Given his commitment to noumena, Kant’s so-
called “transcendental idealism” is not a true idealism.
A simple “realism” holds that reality is independent of us, so that it is
able to provide an objective unbiased touchstone against which we may
measure the truth of what we claim to know. This may sound like
everyday commonsense. Yet historians, of all people, should resist this
realist thought. We cannot look up from writing our histories to check
with historical reality to see if we have got it right. Historical reality is
not “out there”. Any attempt to grasp this supposed “independent”
reality faces impossible difficulties, for imagining that reality is a
touchstone available for use within the world as we experience it
requires that reality to be available in a form which is unavoidably in
terms of our own conceptualisation of the world. There are no
unconceptualised experiences (Sellars, 1 956; McDowell, 1 994).
Otherwise that reality cannot be used to justify our beliefs, it cannot be
adopted as a reason for believing what we do. The very intelligibility of
reality requires that it exist in categorical and conceptual terms which
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used to justify our beliefs, it cannot be adopted as a reason for believing
what we do. The very intelligibility of reality requires that it exist in
categorical and conceptual terms which are grounded in what our own
understanding permits. Equivalently, the more independent of us we
suppose “reality” to be, the more unintelligible it becomes, the less it
could be a “reason” to believe one thing rather than another. To suppose
the full independence of reality is to suppose something unintelligible
and unusable.
Thus “realism”, the philosophical position opposed to “idealism”, if it
is understood as asserting the complete independence of reality from us,
is asserting a position which makes “reality” unintelligible. Yet the
words “reality”, “real” and their cognates are intelligible; they are
everyday words which lose their meaning unless we can understand
them as correctly usable on some occasions, and we must not allow
them to be hijacked by a dubious philosophical approach. “Real” must
be a word which the idealist is able to use successfully, just as the rest of
us do, without commitment to an unnecessary metaphysical position
which turns the intelligible into the unintelligible. A properly expressed
idealism will account for all our concerns about reality without loss of
meaning. In recent decades, with developments in the philosophy of
language and of mind, the opposite of “realism” has been taken to be
“anti-realism”. Simon Blackburn introduces the term “quasi-realism”: a
quasi-realist is “a person who, starting from a recognizably anti-realist
position, finds himself progressively able to mimic the intellectual
practices supposedly definitive of realism” (Blackburn, 1 993, p. 1 5).
When one is an idealist, “ideal” and “real” are not to be understood as
opposites. That great idealist philosopher of history R.G. Collingwood
said: ‘ the ideal and the real are not mutually exclusive. A thing may be
ideal and also real’ (Collingwood, 1925, p. 1 50). Many will unthinking-
ly see that as a contradiction.This will typically be because they are
aware of the conflict between “realism” and “idealism” as that has
sometimes been understood by philosophers: as involving the conflict
between, respectively, the assertion and the denial of the view that
reality exists independently of us, as just described. And, so understood,
“realism” and “idealism” are indeed opposites. But “real” and “ideal”
are not opposites. We should join Collingwood in opposites recognising
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that privileging some particular thought by calling its intended reference
“real” is itself an act of thought.
Certainly there is a distinction to be drawn between the “real” and the
“unreal”, but the “real”/”unreal” distinction itself lies within the “ideal”,
within thought: hence “real” is not opposed to “ideal”. Thus reality,
including historical reality, depends on us; it is to be idealistically
understood as what we pragmatically count it to be, and in principle we
can choose, and have chosen, to count it as we do and have. We live
with the outcome of our inherited pragmatic choices, most of which we
are not able to revisit simply because we no longer see them as the
outcome of choices, while many more choices, even if we wished to
revisit them, are not in practice revisable because an alternative belief
system consistently permitting change is not available to us; or so we
characteristically judge.
In order to make sense of historical understanding, we have now seen
two developments of the pragmatic Quinean web: first, that it be
understood diachronically and not synchronically; second, that it be
explicitly understood as an idealist position. A third development needs
now to be stressed. When we think of the web as being of “beliefs”,
involving concepts and expressions which sort ongoing reality for us,
we may imagine that the point being made here refers only to simple
concepts and to beliefs expressed in comparatively short sentences. That
is not correct, for it is too limited. Historians and the rest of us express
historical reality in much larger units of meaning than mere beliefs,
commonly in terms of book-length narratives or sagas or indeed in
temporal structures or periodisations much greater still.
Narratives, like the ongoing web itself, offer far more than merely a
list of discontinuous atomic facts, but unify them into wide-ranging
temporal structures. Indeed, the facts are commonly sorted as what they
are in virtue of the narratives which contain them. Some historical
“facts” can be treated as having existence independent of their
containing narratives, while others exist as a result of their containing
narratives, for only that narrative construction permits their existence.
Hence, more accurately, the web is to be seen not as a web of “beliefs”
but as a diachronic web of reality-sorting expressions, of whatever
temporal size. The structure of historical time in past, present and future
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is the pragmatic diachronic web. We create and understand historical
time in terms of the ongoing web. It is a contingent matter how far the
ongoing web is best characterised in terms of a “master narrative” or a
substantive philosophy of history such as that of Marx, Hegel, or
Spengler. Sometimes, from a general belief in the perfectibility of
humanity to the totalitarianism of the Soviet Union, cultures have
perceived the world that way. Now, the web permits chaos, pluralism
and an uncertain characterisation of the future.
The transmission of temporal understanding
Transmitting temporal understanding could be a matter of killing or
brainwashing those who will not accept some totalitarian story. Rather
more familiar and commonplace is the teaching of history in schools.
Moreover there is much that psychologists and anthropologists and
others can tell us about our perceptions of time (Hareven, 1 977;
Bainbridge, 2012; Hammond, 2012, say). Here, a pragmatic philosophy
suggests instead the question how we can teach children about time,
given the degree of conceptual choice now explained. Is our basic
grasp of time a matter of nature or nurture? Since at least Plato’s
Republic there has been an issue in the philosophy of education,
between, on the one hand, those who think, with Socrates, that children
are born with innate knowledge, so that “education” is entirely a
drawing out of what is already there, and, on the other hand, those
(perhaps following Aristotle) who see teaching as an input from the
outside to the inside of a person, as nothing but writing on a tabula
rasa. These approaches are extremes: they leave no room for saying
that some knowledge is innate and some not.
The views of Kant and Hume plainly have implications for this
choice, and we have already adopted, in pragmatism, a somewhat
Kantian approach. However, here we need more detail when we are
trying to make sense of time, and the first point to note is that the
tabula rasa metaphor breaks down where time is involved. Think of the
mind as a blank slate. However blank you imagine it to be, you are still
imagining an object, something persisting through time. To deny such
persistence is to deny the mind itself, it is to deny the persistence of
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consciousness. Even Avicenna, with his view that the mind, as tabula
rasa, is pure potential that is actualised through education, understands
education as taking place over time, within time; it is not the teaching
of time. Time is not something written on the slate.
It might be supposed – it is difficult to hold that it might be imagined
– that the tabula rasa persists for the duration of a mathematical point in
time, and that anything of longer duration needs to be taught or trained
into existence. We may perhaps think of the elementary infant
experience of time as being experience of “the present”, conceived as a
mathematical point-present, and that anything more needs to be taught:
complex past and future tenses, for example. Yet Collingwood said,
“The real is the present, conceived not as a mathematical point between
the present and the past, but as the union of present and past in a
duration or permanence that is at the same time change. Thus the past as
past and the future as future do not exist at all, but are purely ideal; the
past as living in the present and the future as germinating in the present
are wholly real and indeed are just the present itself. It is because of the
presence of these two elements in the present … that the present is a
concrete and changing reality and not an empty mathematical point”
(Collingwood, 1925, p. 1 49). As an idealist, Collingwood holds that
reality as a whole lies within the world of thought, and that has to
include time itself. “Time, as succession of past, present and future,
really has its being totum simul for the thought of a spectator, and this
justifies its ‘spatialized’ presentation as a line of which we can see the
whole at once” (Collingwood, 1925, p. 1 50).
Adult humans are very sophisticated in their organisation of time, and
I here accept Collingwood’s view when we are trying to make sense of
the historical understanding of time. Yet it does seem somewhat
implausible to ascribe an understanding of “the whole at once” to the
infant mind, which we may perhaps imagine is susceptible only to
understanding in the present tense. But, if so, it cannot be the present
tense as referring to an empty mathematical point; indeed, the concept
of an empty mathematical point is as abstract a thought as they come,
and imagining an infant having that as its sole innate understanding is
also well beyond the plausible. I am now writing this essay, and it is still
“now” as I come to the end of this sentence. Furthermore, and crucially,
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the present tense does not always refer to the present. “The present
tense… is a grammatical tense that locates a situation or event in present
time”, says Wikipedia firmly, in its entry on “present tense” on the 27th
February 2012. But it doesn’t always do that, and we don’t always
understand it that way.
Consider this, from The Help: “But Miss Celia, she just smiles,
washes the muck off her hands in a sink full of dishes. I wonder if
maybe I’ve found myself another deaf one, like Miss Walters was.
Let’s hope so” (Stockett, 2009, p. 31 ). The narrator, despite the use of the
present tense, is here referring to the past. In large part, with as much
temporal (if fictional) truthfulness, it could have been written partly as
follows, using the past tense: “But Miss Celia, she just smiled, washed
the muck off her hands in a sink full of dishes. I wondered if maybe I’d
found myself another deafone, like Miss Walters had been”. However, the
conversion to the past tense of “Let’s hope so” is less easily available.
While a conversational cliché, “Let’s hope so” has imperative form, albeit
weak in its impact. “Let us” addresses an imagined audience around the
fictional narrator, including the reader. It thus invites the reader to share
immediate inclusive intimacy with the narrator and that audience. As
such, the reader shares in the thought at the imagined time of its imagined
occurrence, and shares also in the imagined “presentness” of that
thought.(Infants, incidentally, find the imperative mood particularly
understandable, if only when they are using it themselves.)
Yet this “present” actually occurred in the past of the fictional narrator.
Using the past tense can sometimes distance the reader from intimacy
with the narrator and this may remind the reader that what is described is
fiction; by contrast, using the present tense, as in The Help, can permit
the reader to suspend disbelief and share a vivacious sense of what was
“real”. Use of the present tense is a rhetorical device to make the past
vivid. No wonder a reviewer of The Help says “The two principal maid
characters…leap off the page in all their warm, three-dimensional glory”
(Stockett, 2009). Reading such a text is not unlike attending a play, which
we watch in a real emotional present. Iprison? They still eat there, they
smoke; they play their instruments! My dead push up the grass, silently
turning to dust; two who were like flowers….the killers, in prison, coolly
gazing at the mountains…”(Lorca, 2007, Act 1 , Scene 1 ).
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Yet the past tense nevertheless can make the imagined reality
immediate, if it is well done: “That was when I saw the Pendulum. The
sphere, hanging from a long wire set into the ceiling of the choir,
swayed back and forth with isochronal majesty…the magic of that
serene breathing” (Eco, 1 990, p. 1 ). As with the narrator of The Help,
the story’s vividness is here brought about in part by Umberto Eco’s use
of the first-person singular; a play is similarly and typically an explicit
demonstration of first-person singulars. Tenses, voices; these are among
the foundational concepts of literary understanding. They are also
among the foundational concepts of our understanding of time, and
among the foundational concepts of historical understanding, so in part
justifying Hayden White’s attention to literary theory in his philosophy
of history. Historical writing is not usually written in the present tense,
although in principle it could be. One could, for example, describe the
court of Philip II of Spain by stating: “there, before you, appears this
gracious, slightly built man with pale blue eyes”, and continuing with
similar detail in the present tense. Yet, while vivid, in the context of
writing history its style is artificial, its artificiality placing a barrier
between the reader and what is meant to be an expression of historical
reality.
The past tense, even where the first-person singular is involved, is
dispassionate and traditionally regarded within the discipline of history
as a more appropriate style for expressing objectivity; and readers
commonly take it that way, although they are well advised when reading
to “know your historian”. Budding scientists are somewhat similarly
taught to write laboratory reports in the passive tense, again in order to
share the scientific profession’s traditional view of itself as being
“objective”. It is a silly view, no more than a verbal pretence that the
observer (inevitably with particular characteristics) did not exist in the
experiment or in the creation of the report. Sadly the academic
humanities and social studies sometimes try to ape this attitude by
anonymising authors. But in art – in much philosophy and history, as in
much painting and sculpture – provenance, like context, is crucial.
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The Narrative of the Life ofFrederick Douglass, an American Slave,
Written by Himself(Douglass, 1 960) was published in 1845, seven years
after his escape from slavery, and this adopts the approved dispassionate
style to the point where his personal involvement is easily forgotten:
“Master Thomas at length said he would stand it no longer. I had lived
with him nine months, during which time he had given me a number of
severe whippings, all to no good purpose. He resolved to put me out, as
he said, to be broken; and, for this purpose, he let me for one year to a
man named Edward Covey” (Douglass, 1 960, p. 87). Here the reverse of
Eco’s mode occurs: is the passage so plausibly true, if the narrator is
able so easily to distance himself from the reality he asserts? In addition,
it is natural to hold that the Holocaust, for example, was a matter of
such evil that it would be morally wrong to adopt a dispassionate
expression of it (Gorman, 2008; Gorman, 2004).
The selection of style, voices and tenses is a choice (Gorman, 2007b),
but the infant knows none of this sophistication. All these frames of time
have to be taught, even the distinction between past, present and future.
Nevertheless, what is being taught are ways of organising time which
presuppose the infant’s ongoing temporal experience and persistence of
consciousness. We were made “looking before and after”, observed
Shakespeare’s Hamlet (Act IV, Scene 1V), although we academic
persons look “before and after many times as far” (Cornford, 1 973, p.
1 4). As Collingwood said, time is all there in thought at once. As adults
we conceptualise it in complex ways; as infants we experience what we
adults call past, present and future even though we do not yet
distinguish them, not having the concepts. Yet those first distinctions are
grasped very early, even when we cannot express them.
As we have seen, for an idealist the world of thought is not to be
contrasted with some external reality. The distinctions we are taught to
conceptualise in explicit language between “the past”, “the present” and
“the future” are in principle distinctions that we choose, for, following
our idealist pragmatism, the world is what we count it to be. But the
infant does not have a choice, and nor in practice do we; the choice is
free only in principle, for we have inherited these major divisions in the
conceptualisation of time. We do not in the ordinary course of events
query them (theoretical physicists do; historians don’t). We share time
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with others; indeed, we share consciousness with others. We have to
transmit that which is already successfully shared, and we teach our
complex understanding of time to our children, for their sake and ours.
Our complex language of time reflects the fact that we frequently count
the present as being of much longer duration than that of immediate
personal experience. We have to teach tenses, even the present tense; but
the grasp of time is innate, ready for organisation; it frames the world,
idealistically understood. It is not the ultimate object but the ultimate
subject of experience.
That the phenomenology of the experience of time shows it to be
continuous and extended beyond the present – that it is not a
“mathematical point” – is indeed widely accepted. Time is not
experienced in bits, even by an infant. In the first years of schooling a
child might be asked to put sentences like the following into the right
order: (1 ) He started up the engine; (2) Mr Smith opened the garage
doors; (3) He got out and closed the doors behind him; (4) He drove out
of the garage (Gorman, 1974, p. 329; Fain, 1 970, p. 283). The child will
not be taught the right answer to questions of this kind (there may be
more than one answer here), but it will have to think it through from its
own experience, which from the beginning was temporally extended in
terms of what happened and what happened next. Hearing a piece of
music is another example of experiencing continuity over time which
nevertheless involves our counting some or all of the experience as
taking place in the present, and children respond to music (even if only
to repetition of sounds) when still in the womb.
Distinguishing the present from the past
We need to be exact in our understanding of the claim that in practice
we do not query our distinctions between past, present and future. We
do not query that these are to be distinguished, nor indeed that we do
distinguish them in everyday contexts; but we can and do query where
the distinctions are to be drawn. There is, in general, much freedom
about how to sort the present, and there is no fixed duration for “the
present” in our experience. Looking back (a metaphor reminding us of
our internal image of time as like a line in space), it is clear that where
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the present ends and the past begins is not fixed. A straightforward view,
in the light ofHayden White’s approach and what we have said so far, is
that temporal structure is determined, for any one context, by the
narrative that structures that context, and the issue is decided on the
ground of whether we see ourselves as part of that story or not. In this
situation, we may well wish to distinguish “the past” from “the
historical past”. A story which continues now may have started long
ago, and so cover much which is past; but if the story continues now we
would not normally think of the past it includes as being the “historical”
past, for that might suggest, wrongly in this case, that it was only of
interest to historians. Is the Holocaust history? There is no doubt that it
is past, but the story is still unfolding, so no. The First World War still
lives on for many, even if only just; it is part of some people’s present.
There is a vast range of stories that may be told, and these have different
implications for our many distinctions between the past and the
historical past, which lies outside our extended present.
Here, following material in a paper “The limits of historiographical
choice in temporal distinctions” which I gave to a Workshop on Time
organised by Chris Lorenz and Berber Bevernage at Freiburg in April
2011 , I will attend to an idea ofCollingwood’s that marks a period when
occurrences are clearly far away from us in historical time, in what is
very properly called the “historical past”. Collingwood introduced the
notion of an “absolute presupposition”, which is a belief or assumption
underlying the beliefs and attitudes involved in our ordinary ways of
life, an assumption which is a historical absolute for a time, in that it is
contingently uncriticisable at that time (Walsh, 1 963, pp. 1 60ff.
Collingwood, 1940; Collingwood, 1939, chap. 8). “Uncriticisability”
we understand as pragmatic impossibility at the time in question: it is
not even entertained at that time as a conscious thought, as something
true rather than false. Only later, with hindsight, may it be in practice
possible to doubt it or actively contrast it with a serious alternative.
Only later might serious alternatives arise. It is a mere contingency
whether they do so. Hence an absolute presupposition is unthinkingly
presupposed by past agents.
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One difference between the “present” (with its associated “past”) and
the “historical past” lies in when we stop sharing with the individuals
concerned the same absolute presuppositions. As Collingwood said, “in
actual history, events overlap” (Collingwood, 1925, p. 1 41 ). In terms of
the ongoing pragmatic frame of history outlined above, at any given
period there will be a range of presuppositions, some with “absolute”
status and wholly unexamined, some consciously known and fixed
because alternatives are not available, and some doubted with an active
search for such alternatives as may yet become available. Looking
backwards, the historical past comes into anti-realistically understood
existence when the past individuals in question have some absolute
presuppositions which we no longer share. Again, the past slips into the
historical past when people in the relevant ongoing stories become
conscious of presuppositions which people in the historical past were
unconscious of. However, because so many overlapping historical
stories can be told, just what count for historians as the central
differences in absolute presuppositions is a matter for historical
judgement.
Relevant changes come when, because of changes in the status of
what were once absolute presuppositions, we no longer feel or think in
the same way. The historian Herbert Butterfield remarked: “At one
period it is felt to be the natural thing, as well as the proper thing, for the
clergy to be amenable only to ecclesiastical law; but in another period
things are inverted, and, without any consciousness of running to
paradox, ordinary people will refuse to believe that the clergy should not
be amenable to the law of the land, like everybody else” (Butterfield,
1 971 , pp. 5-6). He also observed that there are “things that the men of
1600 shall we say – but the men of 1900 similarly – do not have to
explain to one another, and the result is that they do not always get into
the historian’s evidence” (Butterfield, 1 971 , p. 6). Again, “it took a lot
of work, a lot of insight, on the part of Namier and others, to discover
those dim unavowed things that the men of 1760 had not even needed to
talk to one another about” (Butterfield, 1 971 , p. 7).
Collingwood thought that the recovery of absolute presuppositions
could only be by historiographical method, by which he meant
empathetic understanding, that is, the re-enactment of past thought
(Collingwood, 1946, pp. 282ff.). However, the re-enactment of past
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thought is arguably impossible as a means of recovering absolute
presuppositions, since absolute presuppositions are not consciously
thought. Here Collingwood was writing about the nature of
metaphysics, not history; otherwise he would surely not have missed so
obvious a point, that we could not put ourselves in the position of the
past agent and recover a thought which was never consciously there.
To recover absolute presuppositions without empathetic understanding,
without evidence, we may have to engage in the philosophical analysis
of past writings, or have to ascribe presuppositions and choices to past
agents, using a model such as neoclassical microeconomic theory which
is inevitably anachronistic and only applicable with hindsight (Gorman,
1991 , chap. 5; Friedman, 1979). Only hindsight allows the practical
ascription of truth or falsity to absolute presuppositions.
Moreover, even if the actual thoughts were there and recoverable,
alternative thoughts plainly were not, and we, looking back, could not
uninvent our own understanding of the thought, which typically comes
complete with the alternatives. The meaning of the thought would
inevitably be ours, and not the past agent’s, on this approach, since
meaning involves the possible ascription of the words “true” and “false”
in this context. How can we knowingly transmit to our children our own
absolute presuppositions? We can’t, not knowingly; we can’t empathise
with or transmit a thought that is not consciously there. These are
transmitted as presuppositions of other parts of children’s education.H
ence education may close down choices which might be unreflectively
apparent to an untaught child. This is one reason why it is good to teach
philosophy to children. Philosophy involves questioning and analysis.
The ability to think of alternatives to received or established wisdom
involves examining them and reflecting on the possibility of
alternatives; it involves revising them (Gorman, 2007a). Philosophical
engagement with what has been transmitted from the past brings
absolute presuppositions to present consciousness, but at the cost of no
longer sharing with the past those thoughts as absolute. Absolute
presuppositions cease being absolute when they reach the light of day.
This gives a break with the historical past, and thereby introduces the
appropriate degree of historical distance, another spatial metaphor
(Hollander, Paul and Peters, 2011 ).
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We can then question the past in the relevant area without passionate or
partisan engagement because, where absolute presuppositions are
concerned, past agents themselves are neither passionate nor partisan,
since they are not conscious of the issues concerning them (Paul, 2011b).
Yet this is not an argument for avoiding passion or partisanship on the
part of historians. Notice that history was once seen as teaching morality
by examples, and we can and still do use historical stories for that
purpose. This use requires that we regard the relevant past reality as
influential within our own moral present, so that such presuppositions as
distinguish our present from the historical past cannot be absolute –
unthinkingly unconsidered – with respect to moral understanding. A past
with which we shared no presuppositions at all, not even any kind of
self-understanding of what it is to be human, is no source of moral
lessons. Even the historical past has its continuities with our present,
whatever assumptions we no longer share. “Once upon a time there was
an evil witch”; the parable of the Good Samaritan – to be efficacious,
the historical past, even the past of myth and fable, cannot be
disconnected from our own moral realm. We can make millennia part of
our present, if we choose. Such moral and cultural transmission is also
the transmission of our understanding of historical time.
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